黄晓军, 龙勤. 自然保护区管理中的利益行为动态博弈分析[J]. 西南林业大学学报, 2011, 31(6): 56-58. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2095-1914.2011.06.013
引用本文: 黄晓军, 龙勤. 自然保护区管理中的利益行为动态博弈分析[J]. 西南林业大学学报, 2011, 31(6): 56-58. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2095-1914.2011.06.013
HUANG Xiaojun , LONG Qin. Dynamic Game Analysis of Profit Behavior in the Management of Nature Reserves[J]. Journal of Southwest Forestry University, 2011, 31(6): 56-58. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2095-1914.2011.06.013
Citation: HUANG Xiaojun , LONG Qin. Dynamic Game Analysis of Profit Behavior in the Management of Nature Reserves[J]. Journal of Southwest Forestry University, 2011, 31(6): 56-58. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.2095-1914.2011.06.013

自然保护区管理中的利益行为动态博弈分析

Dynamic Game Analysis of Profit Behavior in the Management of Nature Reserves

  • 摘要: 自然保护区管理与可持续发展的实现与周边社区居民的影响密不可分。通过构建动态博弈模型,对当今我国自然保护区与周边社区居民之间普遍存在的利益问题进行探讨,得出不同情况下该动态博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡,最后对最优的子博弈完美纳什均衡的策略组合进行讨论并提出相关建议,以期实现自然保护区与周边社区居民和谐发展。

     

    Abstract: The sustainable development and management of nature reserves is closely related to the influence of surrounding community residents. The universally existing interest problems between the management of nature reserves and benefits desired by the surrounding community residents were analyzed by formulating a dynamic game model, and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game under different conditions were obtained. The strategy profiles of the optimal subgame perfect Nash equilibrium were discussed and relevant recommendations were finally proposed in order to realize the harmonious development between the nature reserves and the surrounding community residents.

     

/

返回文章
返回